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This paper studies the effects the fiscal coordination can have in terms of macroeconomic
stabilization in a monetary Union which is heterogeneous at the level of the mechanisms of
monetary policy transmission. We will use a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary
Union and will prove that the stabilization effectiveness depends mainly on the type and
origin of the economic shocks affecting the Union members (demand or supply shocks,
domestic or foreign shocks) and on the extent of the Union’s structural heterogeneity. In the
case of the demand shocks, the fiscal policy coordination proves to be an optimal shock
absorber only for the countries to which these shocks are specific. In the case of the supply
shocks, it can represent an efficient instrument of stabilization especially if the Union’s
structural heterogeneity is weak.
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1. Introduction 
The creation of the monetary Union has caused the irrevocable loss of two instruments 
acting against the specific shocks which affect the Union’s members, that is the interest rate 
and  the  exchange  rate.  Within  this  original  framework,  a  new  debate  arises:  what  is  the 
impact of the fiscal policy coordination on the efficiency of the macroeconomic stabilization? 
The  issue  is  all  the  more  interesting  since  the  research  in  this  field  has  yielded 
contradictory results. For instance, Uhlig (2002) bases his analysis on the idea of a clear 
specialization between the public authorities (Central bank and governments) concerning the 
stabilization of economic shocks; he therefore posits that the Stability and Growth Pact as a 
passive solution of coordination between governments should be reinforced as it ensures the 
most  effective  macroeconomic  stabilization.  Mundschenk  and  von  Hagen  (2003),  while 
making the same assumption as Uhlig regarding the specialization between authorities, claim 
however  that  the  fiscal  policies  are  inefficient  being  limited  exclusively  to  the  use  of 
automatic stabilizers and that the Stability Pact can’t guarantee an efficient macroeconomic 
stabilization. They support the idea of an active coordination of the fiscal policies that can 
improve the efficiency of the macroeconomic stabilization compared to a non cooperative 
equilibrium.  Lambertini  and  Rovelli  (2003)  defend  the  same  idea  and  show  that  the 
informational power plays an essential part in the mechanisms of shock stabilization. Thus, 
the governments’ leadership improves the efficiency of macroeconomic stabilization.  
At the same time, the fiscal policy coordination can have different effects according to the 
type  of  shocks  affecting  the  economy.  Beetsma et  al.  (2001)  show  that  the  fiscal policy 
coordination has positive effects on the stabilization of the asymmetric shocks, but is not apt 
to stabilize the symmetric shocks. This analysis is confirmed by Laskar (2003) who identifies 
an optimum degree of shock asymmetry at the level of which the fiscal coordination in a 
monetary  Union  begins  to  be  more  efficient  than  in  a  flexible  exchange  rate  system. 
However, Villieu (2000) states that on the contrary, with the enlargement of the monetary 
Union, the fiscal coordination becomes less efficient if the degree of shock asymmetry grows. 
These studies, like most of the literature on the subject, have a major drawback: they are 
based on the hypothesis of a perfect structural homogeneity within the monetary Union. In 
reality, the EMU members display various and important structural heterogeneities (different 
sector structures, heterogeneities at the financial structure and at the level of the national 
labour  market  organization
1).  With  the  gradual  enlargement  of  the  Euro  zone,  these 
heterogeneities  will  become  even  more  significant  and  will  therefore  influence  the 
mechanisms of macroeconomic stabilization.  
Under these circumstances, we consider that the structural heterogeneity of the Union 
affects  the  mechanisms  of  monetary policy  transmission  and  will  study  the  efficiency  of 
fiscal coordination in terms of macroeconomic stabilization. More precisely, we will make a 
distinction between shocks according to their type and origin and will analyse whether the 
fiscal coordination can improve the national welfare of each country member. 
In the second section, we will describe the model while in the third section we will assess, 
by  means  of  numerical  simulations,  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  fiscal  coordination 
compared  to  a  non  cooperative  game  between  national  governments  relative  to  the 
stabilization of the different economic shocks. The final section concludes. 
 
2. The model 
We use a static Keynesian model within a closed monetary Union with two countries (i, 
j ). The macroeconomic equilibria are described by demand and supply functions and we 
                                                 
1 See Cadiou et al. (1999), Penot et al. (2000) for a review of the literature.   3 
consider that the heterogeneity of the Union concerns the mechanisms of monetary policy 
transmission
2. All the variables (except the interest rate) are expressed in logarithms. Thus 
the demand function is represented by a standard IS function, often used in the literature: 
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d
i y  et  i g  stand for the output (as deviation from the natural output) and the budget 
deficit respectively of the country  i;  j g  represents the budget deficit of the country  j ;  r  
represents the short-term interest rate; π  and  i π  the average inflation of the Union and the 
inflation of the country  i respectively; 
d
i ε  the demand shock specific to the country  i with 
zero mean and finite variance 
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The national demand of the country  i depends positively on its national budget deficit 
according to a sensitivity bellow the unit ( 1 < a ) because of the crowding out effect, and 
depends negatively on the interest rate according to sensitivity  δ . At the same time, the 
national  output  of  the  country  i  is  influenced  by  the  budget  deficit  of  the  other  Union 
member in a proportion b . The sign of the parameter b  can be positive or negative according 
to whether it is the output channel or the common exchange rate channel respectively that 
play the major part in the transmission of the fiscal spillovers. The national demand of the 
country  i also depends on price differential relative to the Union average according to a 
sensitivity s. Finally, the national output is influenced by a specific demand shock. 
Since  the  heterogeneity  of  the  Union  concerns  the  mechanisms  of  monetary  policy 
transmission,  the  parameter  δ   is  specific  to  each  country.  If  we  represent  the  degree  of 
heterogeneity  between  countries  by  a  coefficient  h  ( 1 0 < < h ),  then  δ δ ) 1 ( h i + =   and 
δ δ ) 1 ( h j − = ,  where  δ   stands  for  the  average  impact  of  the  monetary  policy  on  the 
economic  activity  of  the  countries  i  and  j .  Therefore,  if  0 = h ,  the  countries  will  be 
perfectly  homogeneous  in  terms  of  monetary  policy  transmission  mechanisms  ( j i δ δ = ), 
whereas, if  1 = h , the heterogeneity between the two countries attains its maximum degree, 
as  the  monetary  policy  influences  exclusively  and  with  a  maximum  impact  the  national 
demand of the country i ( δ δ 2 = i  et  0 = j δ ). 
Regarding the supply equation, the production (
s
i y ) is described by  a  Lucas function 
augmented by the imported inflation. We consider that the expected inflation is zero as we 
are only investigating the issue of the macroeconomic stabilization and therefore leave aside 
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where 
s
i ε  represents a supply shock specific to country i with zero mean and variance 
2
s
i ε σ . 
For any variable x, we define the aggregate component,  ( ) 2 / j i x x x + =  (the symmetric 
component of the variable  x) and the difference component,  ( ) 2 / j i x x x − =  (the asymmetric 
component of the variable  x). Regarding shocks, we consider 
θ ε  et 
θ
ε  which stand for 
symmetric and asymmetric shocks respectively, where  s d    , = θ .  
                                                 
2 In the Euro zone, this type of structural heterogeneity reflects the important discrepancies at the level of the 
ways of financing the economy, of the degrees of market capitalization and of banking system concentration 
(Penot et al. (2000), A. Penot (2002)).   4 
Having described the macroeconomic equilibria we will now analyse the behaviour of the 
policymakers. The Central bank decides on the single monetary policy independently, using 
its interest rate as a policy instrument to achieve its objectives. The Central bank is mainly 
interested in price stabilization (with a weight  0 β ), but also in output stabilization (with a 
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The governments are in charge with the implementation of the fiscal policies using the 
budget deficit as a policy instrument. Their aim is to minimize a loss function (
G
i L ) which 
depends  on  the  evolution  of  national  inflation,  economic  activity  and  budget  deficit  (the 
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2. The analysis of the model 
We consider a simultaneous decision game between the Central bank and the national 
governments (Nash equilibrium) and will first of all identify the optimum decisions that can 
minimize their loss functions. The interest rate writes as follows: 
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The fiscal instrument will have different values depending on the type of game involving 
the national governments. 
Non cooperative equilibrium – in this case, there is an utter lack of coordination between 
governments,  each  of  them  aiming  at  minimizing  its  own  loss  function.  The  aggregate 
component of public deficit is: 
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Using  the  equations  (5)  and  (6),  the  equilibrium  values  of  the  public  deficit  and  the 
interest rate become: 
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3 The target values of the macroeconomic variables in the policymakers’ loss functions are normalized to zero.   5 
The  equations  (7)  allow  us  to  seize  the  difference  between  the  public  authorities’ 
responses  according  to  the  type  of  economic  shocks.  Thus,  the  efforts  made  by  the 
governments  and  the  Central  Bank  in  order  to  stabilize  the  symmetric  demand  shocks 
converge. For instance, in the case of a negative demand shock, the authorities will adopt an 
expansionary policy; the public deficit will rise while the interest rate will go down in order 
to encourage the demand and to boost the activity. On the contrary, when it comes to the 
symmetric  supply  shocks,  the  authorities’  reactions  become  ambiguous.  If  we  take  the 
governments for instance, they will have to carry out two contradictory policies in reaction to 
an inflationist supply shock: that is on the one hand a restrictive policy consistent with the 
monetary policy in order to stabilize the inflation (as the governments are concerned with the 
price evolution) and on the other hand, an expansive policy which would be able to respond 
to the monetary reaction in order to support the activity (the governments are also concerned 
with the output stabilization). 
On the basis of equation (7), we can identify the equilibrium values of the output and 
inflation: 
[ ]
) 1 )( )( (
) 1 )( ( ) 1 (
2
2 2
z b a H G





− + + +
− + + + −
=
α
ε να ε α
                                                              (8a) 
[ ]
[ ] ) 1 )( )( (
) 1 )( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2
2 2
z b a H G




− + + +
− + + − − −
=
α  
ε α ν ε α
π                                                         (8b) 
Fiscal coordination – in this configuration the governments cooperate and the new collective 
loss function will correspond to the sum of all the national loss functions: 
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The aggregate values of the public deficit, output and inflation become: 
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Taking into account the aggregate and difference components
4 of the  macroeconomic 
variables we can identify the equilibrium values of the output, inflation and public deficit at 
the national level according to the type of fiscal game configuration. If we consider  C    N,    = φ  
as the two games liable to take place between the governments, i.e. the Nash equilibrium and 
the fiscal coordination, any national variable  i x  will be written according to the demand and 
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5. By 
means of these national equations, we will be able to conceive the loss functions for each 
                                                 
4 The difference component of the macroeconomic variables is described in the Appendix 1. 
5 The complete equations of the macroeconomic variables at the national level are available upon request.    6 
country  and  to  compare  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  two  fiscal  games  in  terms  of 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
In order to analyse analytically the impact the Union’s heterogeneity degree has on the 
national  stabilization  mechanisms,  only  the  specific  demand  shocks  can  be  taken  into 
account. Thus, if the degree of heterogeneity between the countries (h ) increases, the impact 
the  demand  shocks  specific  to  the  country  i  have  on  the  national  output  and  inflation 



















On  the  contrary,  the  country  j   will  undergo  a  decline  of  the  quality  of  the  output  and 
inflation  stabilization  against  the  specific  demand  shocks,  which  will  have  a  prejudicial 






















).  Such  a  situation  is  the  direct 
consequence of the fact that the Central bank and the governments of the countries directly 
affected by the demand shocks join their efforts in the stabilization process. Indeed, if the 
heterogeneity of the Union increases (h rises) then the single monetary policy will have a 
high (low) influence on the country i ( j ) and the Central bank’s stabilization efforts will be 
more efficiently transmitted to the country i to the detriment of the country  j . Moreover the 
country  j  will have to make up for the lower impact of the common monetary policy by a 
more active fiscal response. Its national loss, which is influenced by the evolution of the 
public deficit, will thus increase. On the contrary, the country i will take advantage of a more 
fluid transmission of the monetary policy and will thus afford to make less effort for specific 
demand shock stabilization, with a positive effect on the national welfare. 
There  is  some  ambiguity  as  to  the  way  in  which  the  evolution  of  the  degree  of  the 
Union’s heterogeneity may influence the stabilization of the non specific demand shocks, 
because the mechanisms involved here may have contradictory effects. Indeed, the influence 
of  these  shocks  on  the  national  variables  largely  depends  on  the  indirect  transmission 
mechanisms, i.e. the foreign fiscal policy channel (the fiscal policies adopted in the countries 
where the shocks appear carry the impact of these shocks abroad) and the common monetary 
policy channel.  
The analysis of the way in which the degree of structural heterogeneity influences the 
efficiency  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  at  the  national  level  is  again  hindered  when 
dealing with the supply shocks. The reason is that these shocks have opposite effects on the 
macroeconomic  variables:  the  prices  fall  down  (increase)  and  the  output  increases  (falls 
down) at the national level if the asymmetric supply shock is positive (negative).  
Since  no  analytical  solution  is  available  to  account  for  all  the  mechanisms  of 
macroeconomic stabilization against the different types of shocks at the national level, we 
need to make use of numerical simulation
6 techniques. They will mainly enable us to analyse 
the  relative  efficiency  of  the  fiscal  coordination  game  relative  to  the  Nash  equilibrium 
between governments by comparing the values of the national loss functions resulting from 
these two game configurations. 
In  order  to  compare  the  macroeconomic  efficiency  at  the  national  level,  we  have 
distinguished between the economic shocks according to their type – demand and supply 
shocks – and to their origin – shocks specific to the country  i or  j . The Figures bellow 
describe  the  evolution  of  the  differences  between  national  losses  obtained  in  the  Nash 
equilibrium  relatively  to  fiscal  coordination  game.  The  evolution  of  the  national  loss 
                                                 
6 The simulations were developed using a numerical calibration that is presented in Appendix 2.    7 
differences
7 takes into account the evolution of the structural heterogeneity degree between 
the countries (h) and the sign of the fiscal spillovers ( 0 > b  or  0 < b ). 
 
Figure 1: Demand shock specific to the country i – relative impact on the national welfare 





























Figure 2: Demand shock specific to the country  j  – relative impact on the national welfare 
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country i
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In the case of the demand shocks specific to the country  i, in order to achieve the best 
stabilization, the two countries need two different game configurations: fiscal coordination 
for  the  country  i  ( ) (   ) (
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σ σ <   and  lack  of  coordination  for  its  partner  j  
( ) (   ) (









i L E L E
σ σ < , irrespectively of the sign of the fiscal spillovers ( 0 > b  or  0 < b ). 
In  the  case  of  the  demand  shocks  specific  to  the  country  j ,  the  same  conditions  of 
stabilization  apply:  the  fiscal  coordination  provides  the  best  stabilization  for  this  country 
( ) (   ) (









j L E L E
σ σ < ,  whereas  the  country  i  prefers  a  Nash  equilibrium 
( ) (   ) (









j L E L E
σ σ < ).  In  other  words,  the  specific  demand  shocks  require  a  fiscal 
coordination game, while the non specific shocks are better stabilized by a Nash equilibrium 
between governments. We need to underline the robustness of these results which are not 
qualitatively changed either by the sign of fiscal spillovers or by the use of different degrees 
of sensitivity of the public authorities to the evolution of the macroeconomic variables
8. We 
                                                 
7 The national losses are developed according to the hypothesis of the independence between the different types 
of economic shocks. 
8  For  instance,  when  the  monetary  policy  is  less  reactive  to  the  economic  activity  evolution 
( 3 , 0    ; 2 , 0    ; 5 , 0 2 1 0 = = = β β β ) or when the fiscal policies are more flexible and more apt to neutralize the 
demand and supply shocks ( 2 , 0    ; 2 , 0    ; 6 , 0 2 1 0 = = = α α α ).   8 
can  therefore  conclude  that  the  stabilization  of  the  demand  shocks  generates  a  system 
blockage at the national level because there isn’t a single common solution which could 
ensure an optimum welfare for both Union members simultaneously. 
 
Figure 3: Supply shock specific to the country i – relative impact on the national welfare 
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Figure 4: Supply shock specific to the country  j  – relative impact on the national welfare  











Nash vs Coordination (b>0)
country i
country j


















In the case of the supply shocks, the system blockage at the national level (i.e. lack of an 
optimal solution which is common to all the Union members) depends mainly on the sign of 
the fiscal spillovers and on the extent of the structural heterogeneity of the Union. If the fiscal 
spillovers are positive ( 0 > b ), the stabilization is attained under the same conditions as in the 
case  of  the  demand  shocks  and  which  cause  a  system  blockage :  the  fiscal  coordination 
improves  the  stabilization  of  the  specific  supply  shocks  (( ) (   ) (
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while the non specific supply shocks are better neutralized by a Nash equilibrium between the 
governments ( ) (   ) (
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σ σ < ). 
If the fiscal spillovers are negative ( 0 < b ), the results change depending on the origin of 
the supply shocks. Thus, the supply shocks specific to the country  i are better stabilized in 
the two countries by a fiscal coordination game ( ) (   ) (









i L E L E
σ σ < ), but for the 
supply shocks specific to the country  j , the fiscal coordination improves the welfare of both 
countries only if the Union’s degree of structural heterogeneity is relatively low ( 4 , 0 < h )
9. 
                                                 
9 For  3 , 0 > h  the country i  prefers a Nash equilibrium ( ) (   ) (
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σ σ < ) ; the system will block 
because the country  j  prefers always a fiscal coordination game ( ) (   ) (
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σ σ < ).    9 
We can thus point out that in comparison with the results obtained for the demand shocks, 
the relative quality of the supply shock stabilization is less robust relative to the parameters 
chosen. The supply shock stabilization mechanisms are not only influenced by the sensitivity 
to the sign of spillovers and to the extent of the structural heterogeneity, but also by the 
relative importance the public authorities place on the different macroeconomic objectives
10. 
The relatively low stability of the results is due to the opposite effects of the supply shocks 
both at the national level and between the two countries. A negative asymmetric supply shock 
triggers  the  rise  (decrease)  of  prices  (output)  at  the  national  level,  whereas  in  the  other 
country these effects are reversed  and considerably less important. Moreover, because of 
these  opposite  effects,  the  relative  differences  between  national  losses  in  the  case  of  the 
supply  shocks  (the  differences  concern  the  loss  functions  between  the  Nash  and  fiscal 




In this paper, we have aimed at investigating the advantages of a fiscal coordination as an 
institutional instrument providing an efficient neutralization of the impact of the economic 
shocks  affecting  the  members  of  a  heterogeneous  monetary  Union.  Considering  the 
heterogeneity of the Union with respect to the mechanisms of monetary policy transmission, 
we have distinguished between shocks according to their type  and origin, and raised the 
question whether the fiscal coordination can improve the national welfare of each Union 
country member. 
To sum up our results, we can underline the key elements that influence the mechanisms 
of macroeconomic stabilization. The first element is the type of shocks affecting the Union 
members. In the case of the demand shocks, the system is obstructed irrespectively of the 
various choices of the model’s parameters. The specific shocks are better neutralized by a 
fiscal coordination game while the optimal absorption of the non specific shocks requires the 
absence of coordination between governments. The analysis of the supply shocks yields more 
heterogeneous  results  which  are  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  the  parameters;  we  can  also 
mention that for this type of shocks, the fiscal coordination can be, under certain specific 
conditions, a convenient solution to minimise the national loss functions for all countries. 
When analysing the relative differences between the Nash and fiscal coordination games 
according to the type of economic shocks, we can notice that these differences are by far 
stronger and more stable in the case of the demand shocks compared to the supply shocks. 
Consequently, it is more likely to have a system blockage in the case of the demand shocks 
than to identify an optimum common solution (fiscal coordination) for all the Union members 
in the case of the supply shocks. To sum up, in a heterogeneous monetary Union each country 
has specific needs in stabilizing the asymmetric shocks, which may threaten the cohesion of 
the  whole  region.  Indeed,  generally  neither  the  fiscal  coordination  game  nor  the  Nash 
equilibrium between governments succeed in providing the optimum national welfare to all 
the countries of the Union simultaneously. Therefore, since the structural heterogeneity is a 
fact and is not likely to change (on the contrary, the future Euro zone enlargements is likely 
to reinforce it), the Euro zone may need to think about reforming its system of economic 
                                                 
10 For instance, when the monetary flexibility is higher ( 1 , 0 2 = β ) and the Central bank is more sensitive to 
price stability ( 7 , 0 0 = β ), the fiscal coordination can represent an optimum solution for both countries in the 
case of positive spillovers especially if the structural heterogeneity of the Union is high ( 7 , 0 > h ). At the same 
time, the fiscal coordination can improve the welfare of both countries if the Union is particular homogeneous 
( 3 , 0 < h ), the fiscal flexibility is lower ( 5 , 0 2 = α ) and the fiscal spillovers are positive.    10 
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Appendix 1 
The difference component of the macroeconomic variables according to the fiscal game 
configuration is: 
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The numerical simulations have been obtained using the Matlab language. In order to 
analyse  the  quality  of  the  national  macroeconomic  stabilization,  we  have  studied  the 
differences between the national losses resulting from the two game configurations in which 
the governments are involved (Nash equilibrium and fiscal coordination game). The relative 
differences  have  been  calculated  according  to  the  evolution  of  the  degree  of  structural 
heterogeneity between the countries (h ). For the rest of the parameters, we have used a rich   12 
empirical and theoretical literature in order to choose the values that reflect the average of the 
Euro zone countries. 
For  the  sensitivity  of  the  demand  to  the  national  deficit,  we  consider  an  average 
coefficient of 0,5 ( 5 , 0 = a ), (Beetsma et al. (2001), Menguy (2005)). The value of fiscal 
spillovers  has  been  established  at  0,2  in  absolute  value  ( 2 , 0 = b );  we  consider  that  the 
spillovers can’t be superior, in absolute value, to the sensitivity of the demand to the national 
public deficit ( b a > ). 
We use the sensitivity of the demand to interest rate as identified by Mojon and Peersman 
(2001) and by Van Els et al. (2001) with an average value of 0,2 for the Euro zone ( 2 , 0 = δ ). 
The sensitivity of the output to the price differential relative to the Union average is  1 , 0  
( 1 , 0 = s ), which is close to the value identified by Creel (2001) and Engwerda et al. (2002). 
Concerning the sensitivity of the production to the evolution of inflation, the coefficients 
used in the literature are generally situated around 3 et 4 (Van Aarle et al. (2002), Engwerda 
et al. (2002), Rogers (2001)); we have thus chosen the value 3 for this coefficient ( 3 =   ). 
The  sensitivity  of  the  national  inflation  to  foreign  inflation  is  0,2  ( 2 , 0 = m )  as  in  Creel 
(2002). 
When identifying the relative preferences of the Central bank, we took into account the 
ECB’s main objective, that is price stabilization. Consequently, the relative importance of 
this objective ( 5 , 0 0 = β ) is higher than the weight of the output stabilization ( 3 , 0 1 = β ) and 
of  the  interest  rate  smoothing  ( 2 , 0 2 = β ).  As  to  the  national  governments,  their  priority 
concerns first of all the output and the public deficit stabilization ( 4 , 0 2 1 = =α α ), and then 
the objective of price stabilization ( 2 , 0 0 = α ). 
The values of the model’s parameters are summed up in the Table bellow: 
 
Table A2: Calibration of the model’s parameters 
Output sensitivity to national public deficit (a)  0,5 
Fiscal spillovers (b )  +/-2 
Output sensitivity to interest rate (δ )  0,2 
Output  sensitivity  to  price  competitiveness  relative  to  the 
Union average (s)  0,1 
Production sensitivity to national inflation (  )  3 
Inflation sensitivity to imported inflation (m )  0,2 
The  relative  importance  the  Central  bank  gives  to  price 
stabilization ( 0 β )  0,5 
The  relative  importance  the  Central  bank  gives  to  output 
stabilization ( 1 β )  0,3 
The relative importance the Central bank gives to interest rate 
smoothing ( 2 β )  0,2 
The relative importance the national governments give to price 
stabilization ( 0 α )  0,2 
The  relative  importance  the  national  governments  give  to 
output stabilization ( 1 α )  0,4 
The  relative  importance  the  national  governments  give  to 
public deficit stabilization ( 2 α )  0,4 
 